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Rapid Responses to:
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Electronic letters published:
![[Read Rapid Response]](/icons/misc/sectionDOWN.gif){kind=icon}
Response to ‘Defining Community in Emergency Response’
Defining Community in Emergency Preparedness
Non-Federal Hospital Industry vs NRP Integration
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Barbara Braun, Ph.D Center for Health Servicess research: JCAHO, Nicole V Wineman MA MPH MBA, Joseph A Barbera MD, Jerod M Loeb PhD
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nwineman{at}jcaho.org Barbara Braun, et al.
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Dr. Jarrett makes the point that integration among all medical assets in the community is a necessary step toward increasing response capacity and capability. The authors fully support this concept. Too often, disparate local health care organizations are not planning collaboratively for a coordinated, community-wide emergency response , particularly in the health and medical arena. Resources expect to work together during an emergency, but don’t necessarily share plans or have a commonly understood framework for coordination under the urgency and uncertainty of a rapidly evolving incident, and major problems result. For example, during Hurricane Wilma, several hospitals had transportation agreements with the same ambulance companies, which became overwhelmed with requests for services (1). As Dr. Jarrett suggests, physicians in private practice have a vital role in maintaining local access to care and preventing unnecessary influx of patients to hospitals. Accomplishing collaborative planning and drills, such as those undertaken by the Richmond County Medical Society, is important to prepare for effective response. This planning group is similar to the emerging model of the ‘healthcare coalition’ for emergency preparedness planning and response. The healthcare coalition is composed of healthcare facilities and other health and medical assets that form a single functional entity to maximize medical surge capacity and capability in a defined geographic area. It coordinates the mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery actions of medical and health providers, facilitates mutual aid support and serves as a unified platform for medical input to jurisdictional authorities (2). The health care coalition is part of a tiered response management system for integrating medical and health resources during large scale emergencies. The 2006 Health Resources and Services Administration Program recently incorporated this tiered model into its Guidance for the National Bioterrorism Hospital Preparedness Program (3 ). This management framework describes a process for interfacing medical and health resources with widening levels of responders from the individual health care organization (Tier 1), through the healthcare coalition (Tier 2) to local (Tier 3), state (Tier 4), interstate (Tier 5) and federal (Tier 6) levels. Communities around the country have begun to recognize the value of health care coalitions (4, 5), but additional guidance on the development and implementation of health care coalitions is necessary to ensure wide- spread adoption of the model. This model was not available at the time that our study questionnaire was developed and disseminated. Our study focus was on the healthcare organization integrating into the community, rather than the hospital organizing the community. Dr. Jarrett’s closing statement suggests “that physician leadership drive this type of integration of resources…” We disagree that common physician credentials make them the only uniquely qualified leaders for this initiative. Interested physicians should move beyond currently disjointed “disaster medicine” concepts to understand “medical emergency management” (6), with the scientific and professional qualifications for developing and managing complex systems. Understanding these concepts and principles will become even more important as the National Incident Management System (7) standardizes terminology and concepts across response disciplines and across the United States. Barbara I Braun PhD1, Nicole V Wineman MA MPH MBA1, Joseph A Barbera MD2, Jerod M Loeb PhD1 1 Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations, Division of Research Oakbrook Terrace, IL 2 The George Washington University, Institute for Crisis, Disaster and Risk Management, Washington, DCReferences 1. Lessons learned from Hurricane Wilma. Joint Commission Perspectives. March 2006: 26 (3) 5-7. 2. Medical Surge Capacity and Capability: A Management System for Integrating Medical and Health Resources During Large-Scale Emergencies. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services; 2004. 3. National Bioterrorism Hospital Preparedness Program, Program Guidance, Fiscal Year 2006 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Health Resources and Services Administration, July 2, 2006. 4. Tanielain T, Ricci K, Stoto MA, Dausey DJ, Davis LM, Myers S, Olmsted S, Willis HH. Exemplary Practices in Public Health Preparedness. Center for Domestic and International Health Security. The RAND Corporation, 2005. Accessed August 8, 2006. http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/2005/RAND_TR239.pdf 5. Altered Standards of Care in Mass Casualty Events. Prepared by Health Systems Research Inc. under Contract No. 290-04-0010. AHRQ Publication No. 05-0043. Rockville MD: Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality. April 2005. 6. Barbera JA, Macintyre AG, Shaw GL, Seefried VI, Westerman LT, de Cosmo S. MSEmergency Management (EM) Principles and Practices for Healthcare Systems. U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, Veterans Health Administration. June 2006. Accessed August 14, 2006. http://www1.va.gov/emshg/page.cfm?pg=122 7. National Incident Management System. U.S. Department of Homeland Security. March 1, 2004. Accessed August 14, 2006. http://www.dhs.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/NIMS-90-web.pdf Conflict of Interest:None declared |
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Mark P Jarrett, MD, MBA, FACP Staten Island University Hospital
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mjarrett{at}siuh.edu Mark P Jarrett
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The article by Braun, et al. underscores the need to accelerate integration of hospital disaster preparedness with community planning (1). The initial linkage for hospitals is with first responders: fire, police, and EMS. Coordination of these services is usually provided by a governmental body, such as the Office of Emergency Management in New York City. It is clear, however, that in a widespread disaster scenario communities will need to be self sufficient for at least the first 48 hours. This requires an expansion of the term community beyond hospitals and the agencies listed above. There needs to be an integrated plan that also includes skilled nursing facilities, chronic disease facilities, free standing dialysis centers, correctional facilities and most critically the community based physicians. We learned on 9/11 that having our physicians all rush to the hospital or to ground zero was not only non-productive, but also actually dangerous. In a pandemic, for example, it would be necessary to have physicians maintain office hours in order to triage the less critically ill away from overburdened hospitals. Similarly, in a mass casualty event, coordination with skilled nursing facilities will expedite the rapid discharge of stable patients in order to provide surge capacity. On Staten Island, which has a population of 470,000, the Richmond County Medical Society in cooperation with the two hospital systems is developing linkages between all healthcare entities. Since communication is frequently the weak link in the management of the response to a disaster, we have conducted a tabletop drill involving both hospitals, the Richmond County Medical Society, a New York State Psychiatric facility and the skilled nursing facilities. The next step will be to repeat this drill also attempting to reach out to all physicians in the county. Other healthcare entities such as hospice and home care have been part of the initial planning and will be included in follow up drills. It is our suggestion that physician leadership drive this type of integration of resources since the health of our communities is ultimately our mission. 1. Braun BI, Wineman NV, Finn NL, Barbera JA, Schmaltz SP, Loeb JM.Integrating Hospital into Community Emergency Preparedness Planning. Ann Int Med. 2006;144:799-811. Conflict of Interest:None declared |
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James D. Blair, DPA, MHA Center for HealthCare Emergency Readiness (CHCER)
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drjdblair{at}comcast.net James D. Blair
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Post 9/11/2001,the Nation's strategy for protection against future Terrorist attacks called for the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security(DHS).The principal authorities that guide DHS are found in a plethora of statutes, executive orders, and presidential directives (HSPDs) spanning decades. The 2005 National Response Plan (NRP) evolves from these derivative sources. There was a significant change in expectations for the non-federal sector as the Federal Response Plan evolved into the NRP. Ownership of non-federal enties range from eighty- five (85%) percent to approximately ninety (90%) percent. Non-federal ownership within the Healthcare Industry has been placed within this range. These realities force the healthcare industry to take a hard look at the readiness of all private and public healthcare organizations. References in this article have identified both "think tank" and governmental oversight organization criticism, some characterize the industry as the "weakest link in the Homeland Security Chain". Homeland Security Presidental Directives- 5-7-8 have identified the non-federal healthcare industry as expected full-partners in the NRP and the National Incident Management System (NIMS). Presidental Directives have designated Hospitals and other healthcare resources as Critical Infrastructures/Key Resources CI/KR. Those same directives have identified healthcare personnel as; First Responders and First Receivers. The National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP)designed to implement the protection of critical infrastructures has had little influence on the current design and construction of Healthcare Facilities. The Industry is in a cycle of building healthcare working environment for the next 30-40 years. Failure to incorporate known "best practices" protection (mandatory for Federal Healthcare Facilities) is folly on a national scale. Your research reflects findings consistent other research and reinforces the appearance of a lack of industry leadership for full integration in the NIMS. Emerging infectious diseases, more robust natural disasters, and increasing evidence of Hospitals as terrorist targets does not bode well for those who fail to become full partners the Nation's strategy for Homeland Security Readiness. |
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